

Al-Aqsa Storm Operation and the Application of The New Paradigm of Resistance in the Islamic World

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Abstract

In the Operations of October 7, 2023, The Hamas Movement Overshadowed Many Political, Security and Military Equations in The Region by Switching from A Defensive Approach to An Offensive One, Which Happened for The First Time in The History of The Struggle with The Zionist Regime. Apart From Deepening the Crisis for The Zionists, This Issue Has Also Had Many Consequences for The Islamic World in General and The Resistance Front in Particular, So That This Action Can Be Used as A New Model of Struggle and Resistance for Other Islamic Societies in Fighting Against Zionism. Based On This, The Current Research Aims to Model the Operation of Al-Aqsa Storm as A New Paradigm of Resistance for Islamic Societies Using the Meta-Synthesis Method. The Current Research Is Developmental in Terms of Its Purpose; In Terms of Approach, It Is Done Qualitatively and Based on Meta-Synthesis. Accordingly, The Statistical Population of The Research Includes a Collection of Articles That Have Been Published in The Period Of 2020 To 2023 on the Subject of Zionism, The Islamic World, Palestine and The Resistance Front. Searching Within Domestic and Foreign Scientific Databases Followed by Analysis of Their Content Which Led to Extraction of Categories and Concepts, The Author Selected 71 Articles from Among 376 Articles the Prioritization of Which Was Done Using Shannon's Entropy Method. On The Research Findings, 49 Concepts Were Identified in The Form Of 8 Categories and Were Dichotomized into Two Groups of External Front and Internal Front Factors. Reconstruction Of the Strategic Relations of Islamic Countries (Strategic De-Escalation), Decline of The Normalization Project with The Zionist Regime, Limited Tactical Action, Geopolitical Fragility, Weak Strategic Depth, Internal Crises of The Zionist Regime, Reverse Migration and Manpower Crisis Had the Highest Coefficient of Significance, respectively. It Seems That with The Application of Such Components, A Pragmatic Model Can Be Achieved in The Struggle and Resistance Against the Zionist Regime for Other Islamic Countries.

Key words: Al-Aqsa storm, Resistance Front, Zionist regime, Hamas Movement, Islamic World

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Introduction

The Palestinian crisis and the issue of Zionist occupation is an issue that can be viewed from two ideological and geopolitical perspectives. The argument of the Jews according to the books of the Old Testament is based on the fact that the Promised Land is a region that has historically had an increasing influence on the lives of the Jews, and conquering it will mean the supremacy, upper hand and absolute consistency of the Jews over others. According to the current geopolitical map, the Promised Land can be considered to include large areas of Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza Strip, Syria, Egypt and large parts of Iraq today (Peterson, 2022). Therefore, the main endeavor of the Jews since its establishment on May 14, 1948 has been the realization of an important part of the ideologies of the Jewish Old Testament. From a geopolitical point of view, the issue of the conflict between Zionists and Palestinians is very important. Why the Zionists have conquered only parts of the land of Palestine from among the promised land is due to three main reasons: first, Britain's extensive effort to settle the world's Jews in this area after the First World War; Second, access of the Zionists to the open waters of the world; Third, the Zionists are located in a geo-politically strategic region in a way that has access to almost all the Islamic countries of the West Asia region that are located in the Promised Land. This important issue can be considered and verified from an economic point of view, so that apart from the access of the Zionists to the vast fresh waters of this region (in terms of agriculture), it is also very important and strategic from a commercial point of view (Aliani, 2023). Therefore, the two issues of Jewish ideology and geopolitics of West Asia can be considered as the most important factors in the historical conflict between Zionists and Palestinians. The two issues that have been the main cause of the occupation of Palestine for at least the last half century, the extensive settlements in these areas, the attempt to gather the Jews of the world in the occupied lands, and finally the Zionist invasion of the Arabs of the region (Taghipour, A, 2023).

The important issue of explanation is that, basically, the Zionists have always used aggressive strategies to achieve their major political, economic and security goals, and in fact, they sought solutions for their survival and life by applying policies based on threats, destruction, bribery and terror. Since the establishment of this regime, obtaining all kinds of modern and sometimes illegal weapons such as atomic weapons and designing a very powerful intelligence structure including Aman, Shabak and Mossad have been on the agenda of this regime. For this reason, the

model of Zionists in confrontation with Palestinians and Muslims has been a model based on aggression, repression and threats, which was realized in the form of wars between Arabs and Zionists and the mass killing of the Palestinian people on several occasions (M. Hersh, 2021).

Before the Islamic revolution, the relationship between the Zionists and the Pahlavi regime was a multi-dimensional relationship in the fields of diplomacy, economy and security. In such a way that Pahlavi II, in his relations with this regime, never faced a deep challenge and even did not cut off his oil exports during the Zionist embargo by the Islamic communities, and the scope of the security relations between Savak² and Mossad was also expanded (Taghipour, B, 2023). For this reason, the Iran of the Pahlavi II era was never considered a threat to the survival and life of the Zionists, but with the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, the set of equations and political relations of Iran with the title of the Islamic Republic and the Zionist regime faced a deep transformation and development in such a way that since the beginning of the Iranian revolution and the formation of its new diplomatic relations with the countries of the region and the world, the Zionists became the first enemy of the Islamic Republic and all communications at all levels with this regime were cut off (Mustafavi, 2021). This issue deepened the threat of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Zionist leaders when the strategy of issuing the Islamic Revolution, obstinacy with the colonial policies of the United States, and supporting the oppressed nations became the model desired by the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on this model, a wide range of meetings and expansion of relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran started with the leaders of militant Islamic and even non-Islamic countries, in such a way that the militant leaders of Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries, while welcoming such a unifying model, started intensifying anti-arrogance and resistance policies. The primary consequence of such a model has been the increasing consistency of Lebanese and Syrian fighters in the fight against the Zionists and American forces in the region (Chang, 2022). With the passing of more than four decades since the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the pattern of resistance has increasingly penetrated the countries of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan and even Yemen, and this issue has created a much more tangible threat to the Zionists than in the past. In such a way that today the Zionists are no longer the absolute perpetrators of force,

2 .The Pahlavi II regime intelligence Agency

threats, repression and violence as in the past, but any aggression from them will not only be met with an equal or perhaps even wider response from the Palestinian resistance forces, but also from other fighting and resistance forces in the region such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, Syrian and Iraqi fighters, and even Yemen's Ansar Allah militias also respond to their aggression from several fronts, and this issue has greatly deepened the phobia of the resistance front for the Zionists (Driscoll, 2023).

On October 7, 2023, for the first time in the history of the conflicts between the Zionists and the Palestinians, the Hamas movement, by planning an operation called the Al-Aqsa Storm, while surprising the Zionists, launched a massive attack on their positions and inflicted a lot of material damage, killing and capturing a large number of Zionist forces. They openly entered their territory. An action that is considered very important in several ways: first, it was very shocking for the Zionists in terms of the military point of view, so that this operation (Storm of al-Aqsa) was mentioned in Hebrew as Black Saturday; Second, this operation was carried out with out-most intelligence-security cover-up, and this was very surprising and very costly in terms of intelligence-security credibility for a vast organization like the Mossad, which according to the Zionists is one of the top three intelligence organizations in the world; Third, in terms of logistics, the set of facilities, weapons and forces of Hamas in this operation has been calculated in such a way that in a very short period of time, the forces of the Hamas movement entered the Zionist territory and quickly achieved the main and intended goals; fourth, this operation has been very surprising for the Zionists in terms of the set of military-operational strategies, in such a way that the locations of the commanders of the Hamas movement and the operational tunnels of this operation have remained undiscovered for the Zionists.

Regarding the necessity of the discussion, several important points can be mentioned: first, during the aforementioned operation, the Geo-strategic fragility of the Zionists became more apparent; Second, during the Al-Aqsa storm operation, an important part of the Islamic world, while explicitly and implicitly supporting the Hamas movement, showed their stubbornness and anger at the actions of the Zionists and achieved unity, albeit implicitly. This issue can be considered as an important and effective opportunity for the advancement of unity of the Islamic world regarding the issue of Palestine and the freedom of Al-Quds, especially in the current situation where there has been an important de-escalation of tensions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Finally, the Al-Aqsa storm operation can be considered as a practical, effective and very important model for other Islamic societies. Previously, during the Trump presidency, the Zionists focused their efforts on concluding the Abraham Agreement³, which of course did not come to an end. Al-Aqsa storm operation showed that it is possible to achieve the freedom of Jerusalem, which has been the aspiration of Muslims for a long time, by insisting on comprehensive planning, adopting a set of pragmatic strategies and efficient logistic facilities along with spiritual and material support.

With these preliminaries, the author's goal in the current research is to design and achieve a realistic, pragmatic and strategic model centered on the Al-Aqsa storm operation. Based on this, the main question of the research is: "How to achieve a pragmatic model in the struggle and resistance against the Zionist regime for Islamic societies?" And further, "What are the main components of this pattern based on?" To put it more clearly, if we consider the Al-Aqsa storm operation by the militants of the Hamas movement as a new model of resistance and fight against the Zionists, by emphasizing on what components it can be a model of practical resistance for Islamic societies in the fight against the occupations and invasion of the Zionists. The current research has two goals. From a theoretical point of view, it seeks to present a comprehensive view so that a clearer understanding of the actions of the Zionist regime in the West Asian region can be achieved. From a practical point of view and since the Zionists are the strategic enemy of the Palestinians and the resistance front, it aims to strengthen the expertise in this field and help decision makers to recognize the challenges and adopt counter policies against the Zionist regime.

Theoretical framework

Literature Review

1. Bordbar and Alishahi (2023) in a research entitled: "Analysis of the Paradigm Leap of the Hamas Movement in the Operation of October 7, 2023 (Change of Approach from Defensive to Offensive)" came to the conclusion that the three main factors of the transition from defensive measures to offensive, the reaction to the Abraham Agreement and the

³ The joint statement of the Zionist regime, the United Arab Emirates and the United States, which was concluded on August 13, 2020. Since the peace of Egypt in 1978 and the peace with Jordan in 1974, it is the first time that an Arab country established normal relations with the occupying regime of Al-Quds. These agreements were signed by the foreign ministers of Bahrain and the UAE and Prime Minister Netanyahu on September 15, 2020 at the White House.

change of the resistance paradigm were the main factors of the paradigm shift of the Hamas movement in the operation of October 7, 2023. The authors also used the structural-interpretive modeling method for stratification, which was placed in the first level of the transition from defensive to offensive measures, the second level and the reaction to the Abraham Agreement and the change of the resistance paradigm in the third level.

2. Piri et al. (2023) in an article entitled: "Normalization of relations between the Arabs and the Zionist regime and its consequences on the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran" reached the conclusion that various factors strengthening and supporting each other have played a role in the formation of this coalition at the international, regional and domestic levels. Therefore, the increase in power of the Zionist regime in West Asia will create several consequences against the interests and national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran and will shape the competitive game in the region in favor of the Zionist regime.

3. Pahlavan Mangodehi et al. (2023) in a research entitled: "Understanding the smart power of Hamas and Hezbollah and its effect on the regional position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Middle East" reached the conclusion that the increase in the smart power of Hamas and Hezbollah led to an increase in influence and bargaining power of Iran and guaranteeing security for Iran against the opposing actors such as Saudi Arabia, the Zionist regime and the United States in the Middle East.

4. Moqoumi and Qaderi Kangavari (2022) in a research titled: "Change and Continuity in the Principles of National Security of the Zionist Regime" reached the conclusion that after more than seventy years of the existence of the occupied Jerusalem regime, the national security principles of the Zionist Regime has continued in some cases, while in others it has changed as long as the strategic conditions of this regime changed. The introduction of new issues in the field of militarism and weapons and in general the change in the form and type of threats from hard threats to smart threats has affected the military doctrine and the security of this regime.

5. In an article entitled: "Perspective of the risks and threats of the Zionist regime in 2023", Attari (2022) concluded that the issue of continued tension and conflict with the Palestinians is one of the most destabilizing challenges of 2023 for the Zionist regime. The year 2023

can also bring important opportunities for the Zionist regime, among the most important of which is the provision of increasing pressure on Iran in the event of not reaching a new nuclear agreement, and increasing the defense cooperation of the Zionist regime with the United States and the countries of West Asia. Also, the war in Ukraine can speed up the level of cooperation of the Zionist regime with the United States and Europe in the field of advanced technologies.

6. Karsh (2024) in a research entitled: "The conflict between the Zionist regime and Iran: a battle beyond Washington and Beijing" believes that neither Iran has the full capability to destroy the Zionist regime, nor is this regime capable of directly attacking Iran, but Any conflict and hostility between Iran and the Zionist regime is carried out under the leadership and direction of the great powers of the West and East. According to the author's opinion, any attack by Iran and its allies in the region on the Zionist regime will result in the direct entry of the United States and a decisive response from this country, and on the other hand, any intervention and attack by the United States to support the Zionists will result in a quick response from China and Russia.

7. Zanotti et al. (2023) in a research entitled: "The battle between the Zionist regime and Hamas in October 2023; Examining different approaches" believe that the Zionist regime will give a decisive answer to Hamas, because according to the Zionist regime, any compromise, tolerance and attempt to compromise with Hamas will be a complete failure for the Zionists, because this issue means a full-scale threat to the survival of the Zionists.

8. Cohen and Shamci (2023) in an article entitled: "The Strategy of "Proxy Wars" in Iran's Regional Foreign Policy" believe that all the unrest in the West Asian region originates from Iran's proxy war strategies against the Zionists. This issue has become more serious especially after the assassination of General Soleimani, in such a way that from Yemen to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon all are fully armed with all kinds of long-range and powerful missiles in order to attack the Zionists from several fronts, in case required.

9. Aziz (2022) in an article entitled: "The integration of armed groups supported by Iran in Iraq and Syria: the consequences of stability in these two countries" believes that the Islamic Republic of Iran, while providing military and logistical support to the military forces of Iraq and Syria, firstly has removed the the immediate threat from its borders and

secondly, he has put all his efforts into the issue of destroying the Zionists by emphasizing a powerful military alliance with other Shia countries.

10. Examining the theoretical literature and the empirical background of the research, it should be acknowledged that no independent research has been done focusing on the Al-Aqsa storm and modeling resistance among Islamic societies, so it seems that for the first time, the current research aimed at modeling the operation of the Al-Aqsa storm as a new paradigm of resistance is done using the meta-synthesis method in the country.

Theoretical foundations

Along with the common concepts of international relations, from all kinds of trade-offs to war and peace, the concept of deterrence is very important; A concept that has been further developed during the past decades with the expansion and deepening of the power of countries, and with the creation of nuclear technology, it has placed itself next to the words “atomic weapons” and “mass murder”, thus deterrence is placed as a positive psychological and mental approach against “nuclear weapons” which has a negative psychological charge to the mind. In fact, the modern reading of this concept is theoretically born in the post-World War II era, but in the traditional meaning and concept, it has always existed throughout history (Szenes, 2023). The devastation of the First World War became the main platform for idealism, and institutions such as the "League of Nations" were created to realize the same issue, but the outbreak of the Second World War showed that relying solely on such institutions cannot be effective for the commitment of societies to peace and the absence of war and violence. For this reason, the set of heavy human and economic losses caused by the Second World War replaced the idea of realism with idealism. According to this thinking, the survival and life of societies is due to the extent and scope of their power, in other words, as long as they do not strengthen their societies in various political, economic, security and weapons fields, there will always be the threat of their decline and destruction. Therefore, the idealistic approach to international relations is completely subjective and far from any reality that governs the arena of international relations, and therefore it will never have the ability to prevent the desire for power and ambition of individuals and societies (Lees, 2023). In this regard, Hans, J. Morgenthau believes that all human actions and behavior originate from

power, and seeking power is natural and inherent. In fact, the desire for power and domination is institutionalized in human nature. Therefore, in order to achieve peace, one should deal with human nature, not act against it. Based on this, international peace will be realized when all countries have the capability and ability to defend themselves, in this case, the aggressor countries will never have the courage to exert power and influence and attack other countries due to the fear of reciprocity. They will not give (Qavam, 2022). Therefore, the basis of deterrence theory should be sought in the intellectual foundations of realism. In a comprehensive definition and explanation, deterrence can be defined as follows: "Deterrence is an attempt to control the behavior of other actors, which is done by using threats." Therefore, deterrence refers to any action that is taken to prevent the hostile actions of the enemy. Hence, deterrence, in its most obvious and main function, tries to prevent them from carrying out and implementing political, security and military measures by exerting influence on an individual, institution or country, so as not to suffer any damage or expense (Ebrahimi and Moshirzadeh, 2021).

As mentioned above, the theory of deterrence emerged after the World II and with the competition of nuclear weapons among world powers. In fact, the emergence of the theory of deterrence coincided with the emergence of nuclear weapons in a situation where a bipolar order was ruling in the world to maintain peace and stability. In other words, nuclear weapons brought with it increasing fear and terror, and in fact, the superpowers were more inclined to show their power to prevent another from a nuclear attack (Erik Jorgensen, 2023). In general, the basics of deterrence theory from the point of view of Holsti⁴, one of the deterrence theorists, are as follow:

1. Defender and attacker decisions will be based on rational calculations of possible gains and losses, correct assessment of the situation and accurate estimation of similar abilities;
2. A high-level threat, such as the threat of using nuclear weapons, deters aggressive behavior rather than provoking it;
3. The value hierarchies of the defender and the attacker are similar to each other, at least in this case that each places the avoidance of violence on a broad level at the top of the hierarchy or close to it;

4.Ole Holsti

4. Both parties have a similar reference basis, so that the signs related to the determination of the parties and the certainty of the action are correctly understood and interpreted (Rasuli Sani Abadi, 2023).

In the end, it should be acknowledged that deterrence theory has features such as capability, Credibility, stability and relevance.

A) Capability: This feature is related to the aspect of states' capability in the theory of deterrence, that is, the ability to strike a possible attacker with conventional and non-conventional equipment;

b) Credibility: It means accepting the reality of having the capability and will necessary to use it to prevent the attacker from attacking; In other words, deterrence is effective when there is sufficient ability to respond to the threat;

c) Stability: If the confrontation is severe enough, the parties to the conflict must not only be able to understand each other about the decision to carry out the threat, but also must influence the enemy leaders about their intentions; An effective deterrence system does not only need to have a powerful military force, but an effective deterrence power must be stable in addition to being credible.

d) Relevance: In the theory of deterrence, the prevention of conflict between the parties depends on the explicit and implicit exchange of views of the parties. Therefore, it is necessary for governments to reveal their true intentions in this field by publishing official announcements, sending messages and announcing their plans. Deterrence is effective when the deterrence force explicitly and clearly informs the opposite party of its intention and determines exactly what consequences await the attacker in case of being attacked (Qawam, 2022).

Therefore, it should be acknowledged that mankind has always sought to create a suitable platform for his life based on his nature in order to prevent war and create peace. A platform or a mechanism that can save human life from destruction. On the other hand, among the theories of international relations, despite the different criticisms of the concept of deterrence, this concept has, during the past years, been able to show its application both in the bipolar system and in the multipolar system. So, according to human nature in the realists view, war is always a tool for countries to seek power, especially with the progress made, i.e nuclear weapons, as a result, it can be said that deterrence, both in the

fundamental and practical fields, is a suitable platform to prevent the war-seeking of individuals and countries.

On the one hand, because the purpose and efforts of the author in the current research is to explain the Al-Aqsa storm operation as a new paradigm of resistance in the Islamic world, and on the other hand, according to the theoretical literature of the research, which is about the theory of deterrence and its characteristics, therefore, with regard to the application of this theory, mention should be made of an important point that during the Al-Aqsa storm operation, for the first time, the Palestinian resistance forces changed their strategy from a defensive mode to an offensive mode in the struggle and resistance against the Zionist occupations, and this change of strategy is considered a serious warning to the Zionists, according to the author. In other words, it seems that carrying out such an operation is considered as an important deterrent for the future aggression of the Zionists, and if we accept this important hypothesis, then how to use it as a pragmatic model for Islamic countries will be very vital and important which we will discuss further.

Research Methodology

Since the purpose of the current research is to model the operation of the Al-Aqsa storm as a new paradigm of resistance using the meta-synthesis method, therefore, it is developmental in terms of the purpose and the data collection method is descriptive. In this research, the meta-synthesis method has been used, and Shannon's entropy method will be used to determine the coefficients of the identified factors. Meta-synthesis is a method that is used to review and combine past studies with the aim of evaluating them, and after evaluating their results, new results and findings will be obtained (Johnson and Abdi Tabari, 2023). The statistical community of the research includes a collection of articles that have been published in the period of 2020 to 2023 and on the topic of "Palestinian resistance and struggle with the Zionists and the conflicts of the Zionists with the resistance front". The author found 376 articles by searching among prominent domestic and foreign scientific databases and chose 71 articles. Then, to check the validity of the studies, the vital tool of CASP⁵ was used, which will help the researcher to increase the accuracy, validity and importance of the studies. For meta-synthesis, Killion et. al, have presented a seven-step method that was used in the present study (Killion et al., 2023).

5.Critical Appraisal Skills Program (CASP)




Figure 1. Research implementation stages

The first stage: Specifying the research questions

According to the goal, the research indicators including what, who, when and how should be answered (table 1), based on which the questions are set.

Table 1. Research questions

Questions	
What?	Identifying the concepts and definition of deterrence and resistance
Who (study community)?	The research community is the studies conducted in the field of the occupied Palestinian territories, which have been published in domestic and foreign prestigious scientific journals.
When(limitations and time frame of the study)?	Studies in the field of conflicts between Zionists and Palestinians and the resistance front from 2010 to 2023 have been examined.
How (method of conducting studies and how to choose studies)?	In this research, literature review and document analysis were used, and the critical tool of CASP was utilized to select the studies.

Second stage: systematic review of the subject literature

The current research community consists of scientific documents related to the concepts of resistance, struggle and conflict of Palestinians and the resistance front against the Zionists, which were published during the years 2010 to 2023 AD. The main keywords of the research i.e. resistance, Palestine, Hamas and the Zionist regime were searched in prominent domestic and foreign scientific databases such as Noormagz, Magiran, Science Direct, Taylor and Francis and ProQuest. The result of the search was a list of various documents including 725 articles, but according to the purpose of the research, 376 items corresponded to the field under investigation and entered the evaluation process. The selected articles were evaluated in several stages, and some of them were excluded due to incompatibility with the purpose of the research. In fact, the criteria for selecting or rejecting the mentioned articles was the research language, time frame, conditions and type of study, based on which Finally, 71 articles were selected for in-depth study.

Findings and data analysis

Third stage: review and selection of suitable articles

In order to select suitable articles based on the pattern seen in Figure 2, various components such as title, abstract, content, access and quality of the research method were emphasized and the articles were selected accordingly. In the search process, indicators such as the title, abstract, content and details of the article (authority of journals and year of publication of articles) were also emphasized. Based on this, of course, the articles that were not related to the main question and purpose of the research were excluded. In fact, the purpose of this stage was to refine the articles that did not fit the purpose of the research based on the title, abstract and content. Table 2 shows the number of selected articles from scientific databases:




Figure 1. Algorithm for selecting the final articles

Table 2. The number of selected articles from scientific databases

Database	Noormags	Magiran	ScienceDirect	Taylor & Francis	Proquest	Total
Number of Articles Retrieved	26	16	13	11	5	71

The fourth stage: extracting the information of the articles

In the fourth stage, selected articles from previous studies were reviewed continuously and intermittently to obtain findings. Information related to each of the 71 articles, including the components of deterrence, resistance of the Hamas movement, Palestine, Iran, the resistance front and the Zionist regime, the author/authors and the year of publication were extracted and the results were recorded in the table 3.

The fifth stage: analysis and synthesis of qualitative findings

In the fifth stage, based on previous studies, codes were considered and concepts and categories were categorized. The purpose of this stage

is to provide a new and integrated interpretation of the findings that emerged from the review and analysis of all previous studies. Based on this, first, all the factors extracted from the previous studies were considered as codes, and then by considering the concept of codes, similar items were classified in one concept. The final components obtained are given in Table 3:

Table 3. The components of Al-Aqsa storm operation as a new paradigm of resistance

Axial Code	Category	Concept	Source
Foreign Front Factors	Reconstruction of Strategic Relations of Islamic Countries (Strategic De-Escalation)	Reviving relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran	Vaziri Seta et al. (2023), Shafiei (2023), Bagheri (2022), Mehrabian et al. (2022), Yousefi et al. (2022), Yatim and Telchi (2023), Ghosh (2023), Bramley (2022), Rosesa (2022), Ma and Min (2022), Mabon et al. (2021)
		Syria's return to the Arab League	
		De-escalation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen	
		Efforts to de-escalate Iran and Egypt	
		De-escalation of Hamas and Saudi Arabia	
		Expansion of relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia	
		De-escalation of tensions between Qatar and the Arab League	
		De-escalation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia	
		De-escalation of Turkey and Syria	
	The decline of US hegemony	Jamshidi et al. (2023), Gohari Moghadam et al. (2022), Pirmohammadi et al. (2022), Babaei and Mir Yusefi (2022), Barzegar et al. 2022), Admony (2022), Alter and Yanarzan (2021), Gottsfeld (2021)	
	The failure of Abraham's agreement		
	Breaking Bahrain's relations with the Zionist regime		
	The embargo on the purchase of gas by the Zionist regime from Egypt		
	Severing Jordan's relations with the Zionist regime		
	Suspension of Qatar's relations with the Zionist regime		
The 30 billion dollar sanction of the Zionist regime by the Arabs			
Widespread condemnation of Zionist actions by Shia authorities and Sunni scholars			
Agitation of anti-Zionist thoughts in the media of Islamic societies			
Geopolitical Fragility	The fence of occupied lands among Islamic societies	Saremi et al. (2023), Najafi and Esmaili (2023), Hazrati Razliqi et al. (2023), Vaez et al. (2023), Sheikh al-Islami and Attarzadeh (2023), Bagheri et al. Kian (2023), Iftachil (2023), Zor and Bakr (2023), Kamar (2020)	
	Pure dependence on American support		
	Expansion of strategic relations between Iran, Russia and China		
	Increasing military operations inside the occupied territories		
	The reduction of support from the United States and the European Union to the Zionist regime, especially in the post-Trump era		

Axial Code	Category	Concept	Source	
		Hydropolitics and energy crisis		
	Weak Strategic Depth	Loss of control over the West Bank	Amini (2023), Sarbakhshian and Ramezani Qavam abadi (2022), Attar and Ebrahimian Najafabadi (2022), Azari (2022), Abbasi Khoshkar and Ghasemi (2022), Zanotti et al. (2023), Stern and Saltzman (2023) Ben Shalom et al. (2022), Pinfold (2023)	
		The emergence of new resistance groups such as Arin al-Asvad and Jenin battalions		
		Inability to fight on several fronts		
		Intensification of armed resistance of Hamas		
Internal Front Factors	Limited tactical action	Psychological pressures of the prime minister's cabinet (deepening internal and external pressures)	Towhidi (2023), Avazpour and Babaei (2023), Salehi et al. (2023), Zarean (2023), Nazarpour and Monzavi Bozorgi (2023), Mizrahi and Sheetzer (2023), Sobelman (2023), Flammer (2022)	
		Failure of the Mossad intelligence agency		
		Inefficiency of the Iron Dome system (inefficient deterrence)		
		High levels of human casualties and material damage		
		Helplessness to exchange prisoners		
	The internal crises of the Zionist regime	Multipolarization of Zionist society	Ashrafi et al. (2023), Piri et al. (2022), Pourhasan and Qureishi (2022), Razavi (2022), Borhani and Hosseini (2021), Ahmadi (2019), Gunel (2023), Gilboa (2023)	
		A big gap in relations with American Jews		
		The existence of deep gaps in the traditional concept of "internal security"		
		Wide opposition of Zionist citizens against the new cabinet		
		Generalization of the activities of opposition movements from within, such as "Black Flags"		
	Reverse Migration		Deep divide between religious extremists and secularists	Bahraini and Ramazani Qawamabadi (2024), Nejat (2023), Gudarzi et al. (2022), Rajab nejad et al. (2022), Fouladi Panah (2021), Krapnik (2023), Cohen (2021)
			Distrust of the Zionist officials	
			Increasing insecurity in the occupied territories	
			The growing military-logistic power of the resistance front	
			The discriminatory policies of the Zionist regime	
			Failure to realize a safe homeland for the Jews	
	Manpower Crisis		Deep class divide	Rezai Panah (2023), Faramarzamenesh (2023), Nowrozi Firouz et al. (2023), Taghizadeh (2023), Pirsalami Arghwani and Arash (2022), Graziani and Gazit (2024), Levy Belz et al. (2023)
			The unwillingness of Zionist youth to join the army	
			The gap between human resources and organizational missions	
High levels of resignations				
		Command crisis in the top ranks of the army		

The sixth stage: quality control of the findings

In the sixth stage, in order to maintain the quality of the findings, the Kappa index is used. This index is used when two raters have prioritized the answers and intend to evaluate the degree of agreement between these two raters. In the current research, since in the process of extracting factors, past studies and the concepts extracted from them were considered as codes, and new categories were identified by considering the conceptual similarities, to evaluate the obtained concepts, a comparison of the opinion of the researcher and the expert has been used. Kappa index is a number between zero and one. In this regard, the closer the Kappa index is to one, the higher the raters' agreement. The value of the index at the confidence level of 0.000 was 0.836, which, due to the fact that the significant number is less than 0.05, the assumption of independence of the obtained categories is rejected, and finally it shows that the extraction of the codes has adequate reliability.

The seventh stage: presenting the results

Based on Shannon's entropy method, it is possible to quantitatively present the model of Al-Aqsa storm operation as a new paradigm of resistance. According to this method, first the codes are calculated based on the categories obtained as frequency, and using the information load of each one, the significance is calculated. Based on Shannon's entropy method, data processing is presented in the discussion of meta-synthesis analysis with a new look, and meta-synthesis analysis works much stronger and more valid (Saraiva, 2023). First, the frequency of each of the identified categories should be determined based on meta-synthesis analysis, then the significance coefficient of each component is calculated based on the Shannon entropy method (Christie, 2024). The following relations will be used to calculate the information load, uncertainty and significance coefficient of the concepts:

The relationship (1)

$$k = \frac{1}{in \ m} \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, m \quad E_j = -K \sum p_{ij} \times in \ p_{ij}$$

The relationship (2)

$$W = \frac{d_j}{\sum d_j} \quad d_j = 1 - E_j$$

Apart from explaining the weight of the concepts, the total rank has also been calculated. Table 4 shows the ranking and significance coefficient of the identified factors.


Table 4. Ranking and importance coefficient of identified components

Category	Concept	Frequency	$\Sigma P_i^* / n_{pi}$	uncertainty	Significance factor	Concept rank	Total rank
Reconstruction of Strategic Relations of Islamic Countries (Strategic De-escalation)	Reviving relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran	18	-0.268	0.146	0.158	1	1
	Syria's return to the Arab League	6	-0.264	0.138	0.140	6	
	De-escalation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen	8	-0.273	0.136	0.152	3	
	Efforts to de-escalate Iran and Egypt	4	-0.274	0.142	0.138	7	
	De-escalation of Hamas and Saudi Arabia	10	-0.265	0.122	0.155	2	
	Expansion of relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia	6	-0.246	0.142	0.147	4	
	De-escalation of tensions between Qatar and the Arab League	7	-0.254	0.138	0.143	5	
	De-escalation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia	5	-0.252	0.142	0.130	9	
	De-escalation of Turkey and Syria	6	-0.240	0.148	0.131	8	
The Decline of the Normalization Project with the Zionist Regime (political and Economic dimensions)	The failure of Abraham's agreement	11	-0.224	0.158	0.162	1	2
	Breaking Bahrain's relations with the Zionist regime	2	-0.228	0.144	0.128	8	
	The embargo on the purchase of gas by the Zionist regime from Egypt	7	-0.222	0.152	0.142	5	
	Severing Jordan's relations with the Zionist regime	5	-0.226	0.146	0.130	7	
	Suspension of Qatar's relations with the Zionist regime	4	-0.220	0.141	0.134	6	
	The 30 billion dollar sanction of the Zionist regime by the Arabs	8	-0.242	0.150	0.146	4	
	Widespread condemnation of Zionist actions by Shia authorities and Sunni scholars	10	-0.235	0.137	0.158	2	
	Agitation of anti-Zionist thoughts in the media of Islamic societies	9	-0.232	0.143	0.155	3	
Geopolitical Fragility	The fence of occupied lands among Islamic societies	7	-0.228	0.136	0.134	4	3
	Pure dependence on American support	9	-0.226	0.132	0.140	3	
	Expansion of strategic relations between Iran, Russia and China	6	-0.232	0.140			
	Increasing military operations inside the occupied territories	10	-0.230	0.144	0.152	1	
	The reduction of support from the United States and the European Union to the Zionist regime, especially in the post-Trump era	4	-0.238	0.142	0.146	2	
Weak strategic	Loss of control over the West Bank	11	-0.228	0.152	0.162	2	4

Category	Concept	Frequency	$\sum p_{ij} * \ln p_{ij}$	uncertainty	Significance factor	Concept rank	Total rank
Depth Weak strategic Depth	The emergence of new resistance groups such as Arin al-Asoud and Jenin battalions	8	-0.232	0.156	0.152	4	5
	Inability to fight on several fronts	10	-0.222	0.148	0.158	3	
	Intensification of armed resistance of Hamas	12	-0.236	0.144	0.166	1	
Limited Tactical Action	Psychological pressures of the prime minister's cabinet (deepening internal and external pressures)						6
	Failure of the Mossad intelligence agency	5	-0.244	0.140	0.144	5	
	Inefficiency of the Iron Dome system (inefficient deterrence)	8	-0.228	0.143	0.160	2	
	High levels of human casualties and material damage	6	-0.225	0.148	0.148	4	
	Helplessness to exchange prisoners	10	-0.232	0.153	0.166	1	
The Internal Crises of the Zionist Regime	Multipolarization of Zionist society	9	-0.232	0.140	0.148	4	7
	A big gap in relations with American Jews	6	-0.230	0.146	0.140	6	
	The existence of deep gaps in the traditional concept of "internal security"	8	-0.221	0.138	0.157	2	
	Wide opposition of Zionist citizens against the new cabinet	3	-0.235	0.136	0.144	5	
	Generalization of the activities of opposition movements from within, such as "Black Flags"	5	-0.227	0.145	0.155	3	
	Deep divide between religious extremists and secularists	9	-0.232	0.140	0.148	4	
	Distrust of the Zionist officials	10	-0.235	0.144	0.161	1	
	Increasing insecurity in the occupied territories	9	-0.232	0.140	0.148	4	
Reverse migration	The growing military-logistic power of the resistance front	6	-0.230	0.146	0.140	6	8
	The discriminatory policies of the Zionist regime	8	-0.221	0.138	0.157	2	
	Failure to realize a safe homeland for the Jews	3	-0.235	0.136	0.144	5	
	Deep class divide	5	-0.227	0.145	0.155	3	
	The unwillingness of Zionist youth to join the army	6	-0.234	0.148	0.152	3	
	The gap between human resources and organizational missions	7	-0.228	0.140	0.146	4	
Manpower crisis	High levels of resignations	9	-0.230	0.144	0.164	1	8
	Command crisis in the top ranks of the army	8	-0.236	0.138	0.158	2	

According to the findings of the coefficient in Table 4, it was determined that the “reconstruction of the strategic relations of Islamic countries

(strategic de-escalation)” has the highest significance coefficient and therefore it gets the highest rank in the modeling of Al-Aqsa storm operations as a new paradigm of resistance. The second and third ranks, based on the significance coefficient, are given to the “components of the decline of the normalization project with the Zionist regime” and “limited tactical action”. Since the coefficients of the components are numbers close to each other, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that all these factors must be considered together in modeling the operation of Al-Aqsa storm as a new paradigm of resistance. In fact, in the process of modeling resistance, each factor plays a unique role and function, and according to the dynamic and complex system of the West Asian region, all cases should be placed in interaction with other factors in order to reach a high level of model efficiency. On the other hand, nowadays, the arms race in the security system of West Asia, including missile activities, logistics, and intelligence-security intelligence activities, is much more tangible than in the past, and the strategic modeling of resistance can be a suitable response to such changes. Because with such an approach, several factors are presented in a coherent manner, which are ultimately considered as a solution to deal with the aggressive strategies of the Zionist regime. In Figure 3, the modeling process of the Al-Aqsa storm operation is depicted as a new paradigm of resistance:



Conclusion and suggestion

Basically, the main approach of the Zionist regime since its establishment until now, towards Muslims and especially towards the resistance front, has been based on a broad offensive-security strategy. For this reason, this regime has always used the strategy of all-out attack, terror, destruction, sanctions, threats and weakening of Islamic societies. On the other hand, before the Islamic awakening, the main approach of the Palestinian militant movements was suicide, guerilla and semi-organized operations against the actions of the Zionists. Therefore, at best, the style of the Palestinian fighters has been defensive. Explaining this cause, one can mention two important factors: structural and logistical weakness and major weakness in the military management of Palestinian fighters. With the expansion of the authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran among the resistance front and efforts to fight against the colonialists, including the American-Zionist forces, the coalition of the fighting forces of the region such as Ansarullah in Yemen, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon and other fighting forces in Syria, Afghanistan and even in Pakistan, the ideology of anti-Zionism with the aim of liberating Al-Quds, stronger than before, became one of the main foundations of the ideology of the resistance front. This issue, especially with the efforts made in the direction of de-escalation of Iran and Saudi Arabia, has brought the scope of threats to the Zionists closer to reality than in the past, so that today the application of the resistance paradigm, with a deep evolution, has switched from a defensive and irregular state, to a strategic regular struggle based on regular warfare.

The current research has tried to design the modeling of Al-Aqsa storm operations as a new paradigm of resistance. In other words, the main effort of the author has been to discuss and investigate the fact that the Hamas movement, as a limited military organization, was able to penetrate deep into the occupied territories on October 7, 2023, with a wide offensive and capture and kill a large number of Zionists, inflicting deep material, human and information damage to this regime. Now, we ask other Islamic countries in the region, which are in enmity with the Zionists, based on what components can they achieve a strategic model in resistance and fight against this regime? The results obtained from the meta-synthesis method as well as the conducted research studies showed 49 concepts in the form of 8 categories, which were separated into two categories: external challenges and internal challenges. In other words, the set of weaknesses and challenges among the Zionists can be separated

into two categories of external and internal challenges, and by checking and analyzing these cases, it will be possible to create a new pattern of resistance and struggle against the Zionists. Based on this, the main components of modeling the Al-Aqsa storm operation as a new paradigm of resistance, according to the significance coefficient, are: rebuilding the strategic relations of Islamic countries (strategic de-escalation), decline of the normalization project with the Zionist regime, limited tactical action, fragility Geopolitics, weak strategic depth, internal crises of the Zionist regime, reverse migration and manpower crisis.

Reconstruction of the strategic relations of Islamic countries (strategic de-escalation) **is the first and most important factor** identified in the modeling of Al-Aqsa storm operation as a new paradigm of resistance. In fact, the strategic reconstruction is reminiscent of the fact that the leaders of the Islamic societies, in order to realize the freedom of Al-Quds, in the first step, should put aside their extensive and deep-rooted differences and look at the issue of Palestine with a powerful coalition. This matter becomes especially important when the international powers, especially Britain, America and the Zionists, have always used the strategy of dividing and enmity between Islamic societies.

The second factor is the decline of the normalization project with the Zionist regime. Basically, since Trump's presidency and the beginning of Bin Salman's guardianship, very favorable conditions have been created for the Zionists to rebuild the relations between the Arabs and this regime. In the following, Abraham's agreement was concluded in this regard. In the current situation when Trump is no longer the president of the United States and bin Salman is also trying to de-escalate the tension with the resistance front, especially Iran, Iraq, Syria and to some extent Yemen, this opportunity can be used in the best way and by applying sanctions and cutting off relations with the Zionists provide the conditions for an all-round coalition between the Islamic communities of the region;

The third factor is the geopolitical fragility of the occupied territories. The Al-Aqsa storm operation clearly showed that the Zionists are completely surrounded by Islamic societies, and on the other hand, they are heavily dependent on the support of the United States of America in terms of military and security. On the other hand, the ever-increasing range of missile attacks by the Resistance Front, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and even Yemen's Ansarullah, as well as the expansion of Hamas's military operations in the occupied territories,

showed that the Zionist deterrence system is not completely effective and in some cases has extensive flaws. Therefore, the weakness and, in other words, the fragility of the geopolitics of the Zionists is one of the other important things that can be taken into account in order to design an efficient model of resistance and struggle.

The fourth factor is the weakness of the strategic depth of the Zionists. In spite of the military and defense system that is sometimes suitable for the Zionists, the fragile geopolitics of this regime is a good explanation of the fact that if a broad, targeted and multi-front offensive (sea, air and land) is carried out by the Islamic forces of the region against this regime, the possibility of confrontation on several fronts will be very limited for this regime, and this is an issue that can be given special attention and emphasis in designing an efficient resistance model for Islamic countries.

The fifth factor is the “limited tactical actions of the Zionists”. Basically, Zionists have always ideologically considered themselves to be the best people and look down on other races and religions. For this reason, in the foundations of Zionism, this group should have the best political, economic, security and military conditions, but this issue faced deep challenges during the Al-Aqsa storm operation, in such a way that the Mossad intelligence organization, which seems itself as one of the top three powerful intelligence organizations of the world, faced with a wide information-security surprise. Another example in this regard is the Zionist Iron Dome defensive system. According to Zionist leaders, this system is one of the most developed defense systems in the world, but it showed major weaknesses during the rocket attacks on the occupied territories. The peak of the weakness and challenge of the Zionists' tactical actions has been their helplessness in the issue of prisoner exchange. This issue, in terms of mental burden, is considered one of the most severe crises of the Zionists in the last few decades. Therefore, the tactical actions of the Zionists, in contrast to the media and psychological propaganda, sometimes have gaps and important challenges, the attention of which can be crucial for the resistance front to deal with the Zionists.

The sixth factor; It is the set of internal crises of the Zionist regime. With scrutiny and research, it can be claimed that this regime is facing a series of deep problems and challenges within its own system. Factors such as the multi-polarization of the Zionist society, the big gap in relations with the American Jews, the existence of deep gaps in the

traditional concept of "internal security", the broad opposition of the Zionist citizens against the new cabinet, the generalization of the activity of opposition movements from within such as "Black Flags" and the deep gap between Religious extremists and secularists can be mentioned in this regard. Paying attention to the depth of the internal challenges of the Zionists can help in designing more strategic measures of Islamic countries against the Zionists.

The seventh factor based on the significance factor is the reverse migration of Zionist citizens from the occupied territories. Today, the leaders of this regime have largely failed to realize an important and principled concept called "provisioning of security within the occupied territories", and this issue has caused widespread security threats for the Jews who, based on the promises of the leaders of this regime, have migrated from different places to the occupied territories. For this reason, the intensification of the military actions of Hamas, Hezbollah of Lebanon and the growing threats of Ansarullah in Yemen, the Iraqi and Syrian fighting forces, and the increasing threats of the Islamic Republic against the leaders of the Zionist regime, all create a platform for the realization of several important issues for Zionist citizens to emigrate and leave the occupied territories. In addition to security challenges, important factors such as mistrust of Zionist officials, the discriminatory policies of the leaders of this regime against some Jewish citizens, and the deep class divide have intensified the phenomenon of "reverse migration" among Zionist citizens.

And finally, the eighth factor based on the significance factor is the "human resource crisis". Apart from the reverse migration of Zionist citizens from the occupied territories, today the leaders of the Zionist regime are facing a noticeable decrease in manpower, especially in the strategic areas of security, economy and military, so that the four basic problems of the Zionists in this regard are: The unwillingness of the Zionist youth to participate in Army, gap between manpower and organizational missions, high levels of resignations and crisis of command in the top ranks of the army.

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