Analyzing the Implications of the Al-Aqsa Storm on the National Security of the Zionist Regime

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Abstract

The "Al-Aqsa Storm" represents the most extensive, significant, and impactful operation by Palestinian groups against the Zionist Regime in the past 75 years. This operation has transformed not only the security equations in the Levant region but also the security and political architecture of the West Asia area. Accordingly, this article employs a descriptive-analytical method, utilizing library and documentary sources, to address the question: What consequences has the Al-Aqsa Storm operation had on the national security of the Zionist Regime?

The hypothesis posits that the operations conducted by Palestinian groups on October 7, 2023, have had negative repercussions for the national security of the Zionist Regime across military, political, social, and economic dimensions. The findings indicate that the October 7 operation has not only had internal and regional consequences for the Zionist Regime but has also threatened its national security on the international stage. Factors such as the ineffectiveness of the Zionist Regime's intelligence apparatus, the failure to realize its military doctrine, internal challenges, economic difficulties, and the impacts on foreign policy following the Al-Aqsa Storm operation have all affected various aspects of the Zionist Regime's national security. This insecurity is likely to create fundamental and long-term challenges for the regime in the future.

Key words: Al-Aqsa Storm, Zionist Regime, Axis of Resistance, National Security, Palestine.

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Introduction

The operation on October 7, 2023, was not the first military attack against the Zionist Regime; military actions against this regime have historical precedence. However, the "Al-Aqsa Storm" operation was unprecedented in terms of its scale and unpredictability for the Zionist Regime's intelligence agencies (Mossad, Aman, and Shin Bet). For many years, the Zionist Regime had not faced ground assaults from opposing forces, with most conflicts with Palestinian groups limited to rocket and missile attacks. The Al-Aqsa Storm operation altered this dynamic completely, leading to a direct ground assault by Palestinian forces, which even resulted in the occupation of certain areas in the occupied territories for several days.

In this operation, the military strategies of the Zionist Regime, including "offensive warfare" and "projecting the war into enemy territory," were turned against the regime itself. The last time a country was able to openly and comprehensively attack the occupied territories and maintain a presence there, albeit briefly, was during the "Yom Kippur War" in 1973, when several Arab countries, led by Egypt and Syria, managed to enter the occupied lands, though ultimately they were defeated. In contrast, the capabilities of a military group that has been under siege for 17 years cannot be compared to those of several major Arab countries. This fact underscores the significance of the Al-Aqsa Storm and the operations carried out by Palestinian fighters, leaving the world astonished.

Kobi Michael, a senior analyst for the Zionist Regime, commented on the impact of this operation: "The Hamas attack was not only surprising and a result of major intelligence and operational failures, but it also carries costs that exceed what may be perceived, and it will remain in the national memory of Israel for many years" (Michael, 2023).

Given these points, the Al-Aqsa Storm can be regarded as the largest, most significant, and most fruitful operation by Palestinian groups against the Zionist Regime since its establishment, a fact acknowledged by many senior officials of the regime. As of the writing of this article, this operation has resulted in the deaths of over 1,200 Zionists and the capture of nearly 250 individuals.

One of the key aspects of the importance of the Al-Aqsa Storm is the extensive casualties among the Zionists. This can be better understood by comparing the losses during the Six-Day War (1967), which resulted in

nearly 800 deaths and 15 captives, and the 33-Day War (2006), which saw 120 killed and 2 captured. However, the significance of the Al-Aqsa Storm and its repercussions cannot be limited to these figures; it must be viewed from various angles. This operation has not only negatively impacted the internal equations of the Zionist Regime and the actions of regional actors but has also altered the geopolitical architecture of the Middle East and existing regional trends, all of which will adversely affect the national security of this regime.

Therefore, this article seeks to analyze the consequences of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation on the national security of the Zionist Regime across military-security, political-social, and economic dimensions, examining how these factors influence or will influence the internal, regional, and international levels.

Theoretical Foundations and Historical Context

Historical Context of the Research

Due to the close temporal proximity of this article's writing to the significant event of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, there are very few research papers or written works that address this issue. However, there have been numerous reports concerning the events following October 7, 2023, and their impact on the West Asia region and the Zionist Regime. Some of these reports are examined in Table 1.

Table 1. Introduction and Review of Research Background (Author's Findings)

Research Findings	Title/Year of Publication	Author
This article is published by the Rasaneh Studies Center (International Institute for Iranian Studies) and discusses the dynamics and characteristics of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation. The authors of this article argue that the Al-Aqsa Storm was a game changer and altered the equations of conflict in the Palestine-Israel dispute. Following an examination of the reasons behind the Al-Aqsa Storm operation conducted by Palestinian resistance groups, the article explores the consequences of this operation. These consequences include the erosion of Israel's deterrence, changes in the internal landscape of the Zionist Regime, the elevation of the Palestinian issue and Hamas's status in the world and region, failures of the regime's intelligence and security services, the collapse of Netanyahu's government, and the prominence of the ideological and religious discourse surrounding the Palestine-Israel conflict. The article presents four scenarios: "Total occupation of the Gaza Strip by the Zionist Regime," "Escalation of the war with the involvement of Iran and Hezbollah," "Limited occupation of the Gaza Strip," and "Ceasefire."	Al-Aqsa Storm Operation: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Scenarios / 2023	Markaz Rasaneh

Research Findings	Title/Year of Publication	Author
In an article published by the International Crisis Group, the author emphasizes that the Al-Aqsa Storm operation has "paralyzed Israel politically, leaving it with neither a clear path to victory nor a viable exit strategy". The author, who resides in the occupied territories, notes that the Zionist Regime has failed to destroy Hamas or secure the release of its hostages. These failures have led to increasing divisions among senior politicians on one hand, and between various political and military groups on the other. The author argues that the inability to achieve the expected outcomes of the war, coupled with the ongoing captivity of hostages and escalating internal conflicts, has made the internal political situation of the Zionist Regime more precarious, effectively jeopardizing its political and social security.	**Israel's Political Paralysis / 2024**	Ma'ariyo Zonsen
Nathan Sachs, a professor at Georgetown University, has evaluated the question of whether the possibility of peace in the Palestinian crisis still exists despite the ongoing war in Gaza in an article published in Foreign Policy. The author argues that while the Al-Aqsa Storm operation has led to the devastation of Gaza, it also represents a strategic failure for Israel's approach to suppressing resistance since 2000, during which Israel has refused to accept a two-state solution. According to Sachs, the Al-Aqsa Storm marks the failure of the "land for peace" paradigm, which effectively resulted in the "creeping annexation of the West Bank by Israel." In his article, Sachs states that the Al-Aqsa Storm has become a trauma for the residents of the occupied territories, sidelining any potential negotiations with the Palestinians. On the other hand, Israel's aggression in Gaza has left unforgivable crimes in the minds of the Palestinian people. Consequently, "each side perceives the existence of the other as a threat." This situation hampers concessions and agreements, potentially exacerbating the Palestine-Israel conflict.	**Peace Between Israelis and Palestinians Is Possible / 2024**	Nathan Sachs
Shindlin, in an article published in Foreign Policy, states that the rulers of Tel Aviv, despite witnessing the consequences of the Zionist Regime's current policy of neglecting the Palestinian issue, remain obstinate against change. They are unlikely to move towards accepting Palestinian rights; instead, right-wing extremism within the occupied territories will be strengthened. Shindlin points out that the Al-Aqsa Storm operation demonstrated that "ignoring the Palestinian issue will come at a cost for Israel." However, "the history of Israel has shown that periods of war tend to lead to a shift in Israeli policy to the right." After examining the rise of right-wing extremism in the occupied territories, particularly following the Yom Kippur War, the author argues that the growth of right-wing ideology and the failure to address the Palestinian issue will lead to security threats similar to those posed by the Al-Aqsa Storm for the Zionist Regime. This creates a vicious cycle that the regime will have to contend with.	**Why Israel Will Not Change: The War in Gaza Will Likely Strengthen Right-Wing Sentiment / 2023**	Dalia Shindlin
This article, published by the Arab Center for Research and Political Studies, primarily examines the military doctrine of the Zionist Regime at two levels: "strategic-operational" and "existential". Dina concludes after analyzing the data that "the Al-Aqsa Storm has weakened the foundations of Israel's military doctrine. This goes beyond military concepts such as deterrence strategy, which has been developed over the following decades; it extends to the point of shaking the pillars of the settlement-colonial project. Israel's military doctrine is not merely an operational system that dictates strategies and tactics of war; it is a decisive component of the mindset, identity, and psyche of Israel".	**The Fall of the Iron Wall: Israel's Military Doctrine After the Al-Aqsa Storm / 2023**	Taregh Dahna

Research Findings	Title/Year of Publication	Author
This article, published by the Stimson Center, addresses the consequences of the Al-Aqsa Storm on regional countries and the Zionist Regime. The author believes that the prospects for normalizing relations between the Zionist Regime and Arab countries, as well as between the Zionist Regime and Palestine, have been weakened, at least in the near future. Furthermore, the author asserts that "regardless of the outcome of the war, Israel has demonstrated military and security vulnerabilities to Arab countries that have normalized relations with it or shown a willingness to do so." Additionally, another consequence of the Al-Aqsa Storm was the failure of the U.S. strategy and plans in the region, which were based on ignoring or containing Iran.	**Al-Aqsa Storm Surprises Israel and Disrupts New Security Order / 2023**	Hossein Vaziriyan
This article, published in Foreign Policy, addresses the economic challenges faced by the Zionist Regime during and after the Al-Aqsa Storm war. The author argues that the extensive military mobilization and the call-up of reserve forces have created significant economic pressure. The article discusses the negative impacts of this war on the agriculture, tourism, technology, and energy sectors of the Zionist Regime. It concludes that the continuation of wartime conditions between the Zionist Regime and Gaza will lead to a significant decrease in the regime's economic growth, which could have various repercussions in other areas.	**The Economy of War in Israel Cannot Remain Sustainable Forever / 2023**	Anchal Wahra.

Theoretical Foundations
National Security

The concept of "national security," like other concepts in the humanities, has multiple definitions. The root of this divergence in definitions can be attributed to the varied interpretations and perceptions individuals, groups, and countries have regarding the term. One of the primary reasons for this lack of consensus is the broad and general nature of many issues, human values, and social concerns that are all influenced by the concept of national security (Basiri, 2001: 166).

Arnold Wolfers defines national security in objective terms as the absence of threats to acquired values, while in subjective terms, he describes it as the lack of fear regarding the potential attack on those values. Walter Lippmann states that a country is secure if it does not have to sacrifice its vital interests in the event of war and can preserve those interests by winning the war (Ram, 1993: 5).

Barry Buzan generally defines security as "freedom from threat," contextualizing it within the international system as "the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and territorial integrity" (Buzan, 2018: 32).

Amos Jordan and William Taylor expand the definition of national security to encompass protection against physical harm. They interpret national security as "the safeguarding of vital economic and political interests," the loss of which could threaten the core values and vitality of a country (Ram, 1993: 5).

Prager and Simoni define national security as "a component of government policy aimed at creating favorable national and international political conditions for establishing or expanding vital values against existing and potential enemies" (Sivic, 2004: 1-2).

In a broad interpretation, most scholars in the field of security refer to the following objectives of national security:

1. Preservation of independence and territorial integrity,
2. Achievement of public welfare and political stability,
3. Maintenance and promotion of national and ideological values,
4. Provision of assurance against threats.

Based on a comprehensive definition of security, the dimensions of national security can be divided into five aspects: "military," "political," "economic," "social," and "environmental." Given the impact of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation on four of these dimensions concerning the security of the Zionist Regime, a brief overview of these aspects will be provided.

A) Military Security

"Military security" is the oldest and most traditional element of national security. This aspect of security is defined as the absence of external and internal threats to a country's acquired material and spiritual values, along with a lack of fear regarding those threats (Dehghani Firouzabadi, 2017: 23).

The central focus of military security revolves around "war" and "the instruments of force." The specific aim in this dimension of security is to prevent the outbreak of war and, should war occur, to achieve victory in it (Mandell, 2019: 70).

B) Political Security

As Barry Buzan has noted, "Political security pertains to the organizational stability of countries, the governmental systems, and the ideologies that grant them legitimacy" (Buzan, 2018: 33). Political security has both internal and international dimensions. The internal level

refers to the relationship between the government and the populace, while the international level concerns the relationships and interactions among states (Dehghani Firouzabadi, 2017: 24).

C) Economic Security

"Economic security," according to Barry Buzan, refers to "the ability to meet the needs of society and its people; the economic well-being and livelihood, industrial development, technological advancements, and commercial activities through the maintenance of organizing principles and the structure of the national economy; ensuring free access to resources, capital, and global markets; and being resilient against structural and economic threats" (Dehghani Firouzabadi, 2017: 28).

Robert Mandell describes economic security as "the extent to which the lifestyle of a community is preserved and enhanced through the provision of goods and services, both through domestic operations and participation in international markets" (Mandell, 2019: 81).

D) Social-Cultural Security

This dimension of security relates to the ability to preserve traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, identity, and national customs (Buzan, 2018: 33). "Social-cultural security" is closely linked to political security; however, unlike political security, which seeks to maintain the organizational stability of the state and prevailing governance ideas, social-cultural security focuses on collective identity and "national identity." Therefore, the reference goal in the dimension of social-cultural security is identity (Abdollahkhani, 2019: 130).

Social threats, such as those faced by the Zionist Regime from Arabs or those encountered by Slavic countries from Nazi Germany, are examples of social threats (Buzan, 2018: 146).

Research Methodology

The research method is descriptive-explanatory in nature. In terms of objectives, it is developmental-applied, and based on the type of data, it is qualitative. Data collection has been conducted through library research, utilizing the internet, and referencing various documents.

Research Findings and Data Analysis
Findings
Causes of the Al-Aqsa Storm Operation

Hamas has cited the desecration of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the oppression of Palestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank as the reasons for initiating the Al-Aqsa Storm operation. Consequently, Mohammed Deif, the overall commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades—the military wing of Hamas—stated upon announcing the operation's commencement:

"This operation is in response to the aggressions of the occupying enemy at Al-Aqsa Mosque and the dragging of women across the ground in its courtyard" (Rasaneh, 2023).

However, it appears that Hamas and the resistance groups have objectives that extend beyond these immediate concerns. One of the most significant, and perhaps the primary, reasons for carrying out such an operation at this time is to elevate the Palestinian issue to the forefront of the Islamic world and to undermine the normalization of relations with the Zionist Regime by regional countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. In other words, as Bajaghouli and Nasr emphasize:

"The main goal of this attack is to disrupt the status quo, which was gradually leading to the marginalization of the Palestinian cause, and to restore their struggles to the forefront of Arab politics" (Bajaghouli and Nasr, 2024).

Since the normalization process among Arab countries began with the Abraham Accords in 2020, the notion emerged that normalization could be achieved without resolving the Palestinian issue. Consequently, the Palestinian cause increasingly lost its priority in the foreign policies of several regional and international countries. In this context, Hamas and Palestinian resistance groups, recognizing the accelerating pace of normalization and its arrival at the Saudi stage, designed a large-scale and impactful operation aimed at sidelining and even countering this normalization process.

The increasing interactions between Saudi Arabia and the Zionist Regime (including official visits by Israeli ministers to Saudi Arabia), Bin Salman's recent interview with Fox News regarding normalization with the Zionist Regime (Visrat, 2023), and reports suggesting that

normalization could occur by spring 2024 (Reuters, 2023) are key points to consider in understanding the rationale behind the Al-Aqsa Storm operation.

Given these circumstances, the emergence of corridor projects and the formation of a new order in West Asia with the central involvement of the Zionist Regime led Hamas and other resistance groups to conclude that the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and the Zionist Regime would not be similar to the normalization with the UAE, and its realization could have far-reaching and profound consequences for the future of Palestine and the region, further limiting their operational freedom.

Additionally, there were other reasons for the onset of the war, including:

1. Increased aggressive actions by the Zionist Regime and the United States in West Asia,
2. The necessity to halt joint Israeli-American operations in the region,
3. Support for the West Bank at a time when the Palestinian Authority is experiencing a decline.

Alongside these factors, discussions have emerged suggesting that the Zionist Regime was poised to attack Hamas, implying that this action was somewhat "preemptive." The escalating oppression faced by Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem—reaching its peak under Benjamin Netanyahu's extremist cabinet—has also been highlighted as a contributing context for the formation of this military operation.

Contexts Leading to the Al-Aqsa Storm Operation

Several factors created the conditions for the initiation of such an operation and acted as driving forces for its commencement, which are outlined below.

A) Neglect and Misperception of the Zionist Regime Regarding Gaza

The first factor contributing to the start of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation is the neglect of the Zionist regime's leaders concerning the southern front and their misperception of a lack of threat from Gaza. Reports and analyses from various analysts, as well as official documents from the Zionist regime, indicate that they held a different view of Hamas and effectively excluded Gaza from their intense war scenarios. Notably, Hezbollah's deceptive operations played a role in escalating

tensions with the Zionist regime. In the months leading up to the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, Hezbollah set up two tents on the border between Lebanon and the Zionist regime, diverting attention to the northern front and consequently causing the leaders of the Zionist regime to pay less attention to the southern front.

B) Internal Divisions within the Israeli Regime

Internal tensions and divisions within the Zionist regime represent another significant factor. The ongoing protests against Netanyahu's judicial reforms, marked by the "Forty Saturdays" of protest, have intensified conflicts among Zionist Jews and deepened demographic and party divides. This situation has sometimes led to military and intelligence organizations withdrawing from commitment, thereby creating conditions favorable for resistance groups to plan their attack.

C) Conflicts in the West Bank

The third reason can be attributed to the chaotic situation in the West Bank and the escalation of confrontations between Palestinians and Zionists there. Since 2020, with the rise of the extremist government, the number of Palestinian martyrdom operations and aggressive actions by the Zionists in the West Bank has increased, setting the stage for inciting the local populace and the potential outbreak of war. Following the Second Intifada (2000-2005), the West Bank experienced some of its most critical days in the last three years, initially capturing the focus of the Zionist regime on the central front and also garnering public support.

Additionally, the global attention on the Ukraine crisis and NATO's focus on Russia, as the primary ally of the Zionist regime, created conditions that allowed Palestinian groups to act more effectively and exert pressure on the international community, especially Europe. It can be argued that the combination of favorable conditions alongside significant threats led resistance groups to conclude that they should take advantage of the Zionist regime's operational and intelligence surprise, aiming to deliver a substantial blow to the regime.

4-1-3. Reasons for the Zionist Regime's Surprise

The primary mission of intelligence agencies is to prevent "strategic surprise," which is exactly what the Zionist regime experienced during the Al-Aqsa Storm operation. Historically, this regime has not been caught off guard in many of its wars with regional countries. Even during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, intelligence agencies warned Israeli leaders of an impending attack, but it was the political leaders who were

ultimately surprised. In the case of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, the security apparatus of the Zionist regime was completely taken by surprise, and this surprise was not tactical but rather strategic. Ronen Bar, the head of the Israeli internal security service (Shin Bet), acknowledged this failure in an interview and took responsibility for it (Reuters, 2023).

Several reasons can be cited for the surprise experienced by the Zionist regime's intelligence agencies. From the author's perspective, the most significant factor relates to the "misperception of the regime's leaders and Hamas's confidence-building strategy in recent years" (Moghimi, 2023). The way the leaders of the Zionist regime viewed Gaza and Hamas was fundamentally different from the reality that unfolded during the Al-Aqsa Storm operation.

Israeli leaders considered Hamas a "necessary evil," believing its presence served the interests of the Zionist regime. One of the most credible sources supporting this view is the "2023 Strategic Assessment Report" published annually by the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel, which analyzes the regime's perspective on strategic issues. In the section dedicated to the Palestinian issue, the authors identify the main threats in the Palestinian front as stemming from concerns related to the West Bank and the loss of legitimacy for the Palestinian Authority, with no mention of war with Hamas. Notably, the authors express the belief that:

"Israel currently has no alternative to Hamas's governance in Gaza, as there is no more moderate and responsible leadership capable of taking control. Therefore, Israel effectively recognizes Hamas and assists it (to some extent through the reconstruction of infrastructure in Gaza, providing work permits for Gazan workers in Israel, and expanding trade to and from Gaza)" (Dekel et al., 2023: 60-68).

Benjamin Netanyahu also stated at a Likud party meeting in 2019:

"Anyone who wants to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state must support the strengthening of Hamas. This is part of our strategy to divide the Palestinians between those in Gaza and those in Judea and Samaria" (Lifer, 2023).

Such perceptions can also be gleaned from interviews with analysts and even senior officials of the Zionist regime. For instance, many Israeli officials attributed Hamas's non-involvement in the Islamic Jihad's conflict with the regime to the rationality of Hamas's leaders and the deterrent power of the Zionist regime (Rasaneh, 2023). This process even led Tzachi Hanegbi, head of the Israeli Security Council, to state: "Hamas will be a deterrent for at least the next fifteen years" (Lin, 2023).

In addition to the aforementioned issues, in recent years, the majority of the Zionist regime's war scenarios have focused on the northern front and the fight against Hezbollah, with the Israeli army having conducted no maneuvers in the Gaza Strip for nearly fifteen years. An examination of the regime's urban warfare and high-intensity conflict exercises corroborates this assertion. In this context, Orna Mizrahi, a senior researcher at the Israeli National Security Studies Center, emphasizes:

"In recent years, the Israeli army has prepared for scenarios involving war with Hezbollah and has conducted exercises to respond to its combined attacks, which include extensive rocket fire from Palestine and ground assaults by this organization's commando forces. This plan was devised by Hezbollah and executed by Hamas on October 7" (Mizrahi, 2023).

Beyond the factors discussed, several additional reasons contributed to the surprise and the intensified impact on the Zionist regime during the Al-Aqsa Storm operation:

1. The extraordinary capability of Hamas in stealth operations,
2. The protection of intelligence among Palestinian groups,
3. The execution of specialized tactics suited to the combat environment,
4. Hamas's intelligence dominance over the occupied territories and its precise understanding of the operational environment.

Analysis of Findings

Implications of the Al-Aqsa Storm on the National Security of the Zionist Regime

The Al-Aqsa Storm operation represents the most significant defeat for the Zionist regime in recent decades, and arguably since the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948. This conflict will have far-reaching implications for both the regime and the region, to the extent that some analysts have begun to categorize the Middle East as pre- and post-October 7, asserting that the Al-Aqsa Storm has led to a "reconfiguration of Middle Eastern dynamics" (Fantappi and Nasr, 2023).

Prior to October 7, regional trends were moving toward a networked order centered on the United States, prioritizing geoeconomic discussions through corridors and developmental projects. The Zionist regime sought to play a central role in the security architecture of West Asia through its

normalization initiatives. However, the Al-Aqsa Storm operation has transformed this trajectory, re-establishing the significance of hard security issues that had previously diminished in Israeli society and giving them renewed importance in both domestic and foreign relations.

In this context, Jonathan Conricus, former spokesperson for the Zionist regime's army, remarked, "This attack is comparable to Pearl Harbor, and everything will change in Israel afterward" (Berlinger, 2023).

Given this backdrop, the implications of the Al-Aqsa Storm on the national security of the Zionist regime can be examined across military-security, political-social, and economic dimensions.

Security-Military Implications

An analysis of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation and its subsequent developments reveals that one of the most significant consequences for the national security of the Zionist regime has been the "erosion of its security-military foundations." The failure of the regime's military and defensive doctrine has become particularly evident, and many of the repercussions of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation can be examined through this lens.

In essence, Hamas, as a non-state actor with limited capabilities compared to the Zionist regime, was able to effectively challenge the regime's defensive and military doctrine, which is based on four key principles:

1. Deterrence
2. Early warning
3. Military decision-making and swift victory
4. Civil defense (Moghimi and Ghaderi, 2022: 19)

These principles will be explored in relation to the Al-Aqsa Storm operation.

A. Deterrence

As outlined above, "deterrence" is the foremost element in the defensive and military doctrine of the Zionist regime. Deterrence aims to maintain the existing strategic status quo and prevent it from devolving into a hostile environment that necessitates military action. At its highest

level, deterrence seeks to "impose political will on the adversary without resorting to war" (Nahas, 2021: 15). Acknowledging that it cannot achieve its long-term political objectives through military force or effectively address its security threats, the Zionist regime has prioritized deterrence as the core of its security-military doctrine.

The Al-Aqsa Storm operation and its unprecedented success left the world astonished. This operation called into question the regime's deterrence capacity both regionally and internationally. Eitan Shamir, former head of the National Security Doctrine Department at the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs, stated, "On October 7, 2023, Israel's deterrence was completely shattered" (Shamir, 2023). Due to the fundamental asymmetry between the Zionist regime and groups like Hamas, restoring the regime's deterrence will be a challenging, if not impossible, task. The remarks of Ayatollah Khamenei regarding the "irreparable" consequences of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation for the Zionist regime are indicative of this situation.

Furthermore, since its withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the Zionist regime has spent billions of dollars on border security measures to monitor any weapons and missile traffic towards Gaza. It has also invested hundreds of millions of dollars in constructing an intelligent border system (equipped with sensors and smart underground walls), which was completed in 2021. The Al-Aqsa Storm attack, which saw nearly two thousand Palestinians breach the occupied territories, called into question the effectiveness of such technologies and effectively undermined the public perception of the regime's invulnerability. This challenge to the regime's deterrence could inspire Palestinians in the West Bank and those living near the Zionist regime.

With the onset of the Al-Aqsa Storm, regional resistance groups, including Hezbollah, Ansar Allah, and Iraqi resistance factions, have engaged in limited warfare, primarily using missile and rocket attacks against the Zionist regime. They have even targeted key infrastructure, including in Eilat, Haifa, and Mount Meron. Consequently, despite several months of conflict, the Zionist regime has failed to restore the necessary deterrence, even with the support of the United States and Western countries, and has been unable to halt the attacks from resistance groups, particularly Hezbollah and Ansar Allah.

B. Early Warning

The second principle in the military and defensive doctrine of the Zionist regime is "early warning." Several factors, such as the regime's unfavorable geographical position, the capability of Arab countries to launch rapid attacks on the Jewish state, the significant demographic potential of Arabs, and the asymmetry in demographic and territorial characteristics between Arab countries and the Zionist regime, have elevated the concept of early warning to a crucial place within Israel's military and defensive doctrine.

When the principle of deterrence failed and the enemies of the Zionist regime engaged in conflict with its officials, the Israeli intelligence agencies were unable to provide advance warning of the attack and inform the governing authorities in time to take necessary measures to prevent the downfall of the Jewish state. This principle was not realized during the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, resulting in a significant military-intelligence failure for the regime. This occurred despite the regime's entrenched belief in the strength and invincibility of its security apparatus. The strategic surprise experienced by the Israeli intelligence services and their failure to accurately understand the developments in Gaza led to the regime's unpreparedness for an assault by Palestinian groups, ultimately resulting in a ground offensive against them.

C. Military Decision-Making

The third principle of the Zionist regime's military-defense doctrine is "military decision-making." This principle refers to the ability to deter the enemy from continuing the war, to destroy its military capabilities, or to weaken its psychological will and determination to engage in combat. In a military context, this concept implies demonstrating to the enemy that the use of military force is futile. Given that the Zionist regime exists in a state of continuous and perpetual warfare, this principle is intricately linked to the concept of deterrence. As Shmuel Bar states:

"In any military confrontation between Israel and its enemies, restoring deterrence is one of the key strategic objectives of the war" (Bar, 2020: 235).

During the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, we observed that despite several months of intense conflict and the Zionist regime's brutal attacks on the

Gaza Strip, resistance groups continued to target areas within the regime daily with rockets and missiles. To date, the Zionist regime has been unable to neutralize these Palestinian attacks or achieve significant strategic objectives in Gaza.

Furthermore, military and political officials within the Zionist regime have been unable to formulate a coherent decision regarding the future of the Gaza Strip, effectively finding themselves in a "strategic deadlock." The Wall Street Journal noted that despite more than four months of conflict, 80 percent of Hamas's underground tunnels and its human and material resources remain intact (Yusuf and Malsin, 2024).

D. Civil Defense

The fourth fundamental principle in the Zionist regime's military-defense doctrine is "civil defense." This principle has been recently added to the regime's military doctrine, particularly over the past two decades. As the security environment of the Zionist regime has evolved, its enemies have shifted from the second ring (neighbors) to the first ring (within the occupied territories) and the third ring (surrounding countries).

With the transition from conventional threats to unconventional and asymmetric ones, there has been a need to reassess the military doctrine of the Zionist regime. While the military doctrine of the Jewish state was initially based on "three pillars" in the first decade, a fourth component has been integrated into the security triangle in the new era, especially in the twenty-first century.

In other words, alongside the components of deterrence, early warning, and military decision-making, the concept of civil defense, or more broadly the idea of "defense," has been incorporated into the military doctrine of the Zionist regime.

Meridor and Eldadi, senior generals in the Israeli regime, have provided a broad definition of civil defense:

"Defense encompasses all national efforts to protect the home front, which relates to the primary theater of battle, particularly the defense of people and strategic infrastructure. This includes safeguarding homes,

enhancing deterrent potential, increasing the government's maneuverability, fostering a greater sense of security, and reducing vulnerabilities in national infrastructure. Additionally, defense focuses on protecting sensitive facilities, population centers, and official information" (Moghimi and Ghaderi, 2022: 32).

Civil defense specifically addresses asymmetric threats posed by movements within the occupied territories and guerrilla actions by non-state actors such as Hezbollah. Thus, the defensive principle, framed in the context of protection, primarily involves creating effective mechanisms to safeguard the home front against missile attacks. Given this definition of civil defense, the events that transpired during the Al-Aqsa Storm operation resulted in over a thousand deaths, more than four thousand injuries, and the capture of 250 individuals. Furthermore, the settlements surrounding the Gaza Strip suffered extensive damage, with some being completely evacuated.

The statement from the Israeli army spokesperson that "nearly half a million Israelis have been displaced from their homes in northern and southern occupied Palestine" indicates that this principle was also compromised during the Al-Aqsa Storm. The leaders of the regime failed to defend their citizens, effectively transforming the Zionist state into one of the most insecure places in the world for Jewish Israelis. Additionally, a report from the University of Haifa revealed that 60 percent of Israelis are experiencing psychological issues, including stress, anxiety, and depression (Ynet, 2023).

Political-Social Implications

The political-social implications of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation on the national security of the Zionist regime can be examined at both "internal" and "external" levels. Externally, one of the primary and significant consequences of the Al-Aqsa Storm conflict has been the halt of the normalization of relations with Arab countries. Leading up to October 7, relations between Arab nations in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, had been on an upward trajectory, with some reports even suggesting the possibility of normalization between Saudi Arabia and the Zionist regime by spring 2024. In fact, Saudi Arabia's entry into the Abraham Accords and the potential for other Arab and Islamic countries to join this process would have transformed the regional order in favor of the Zionist regime and the United States. However, the Al-Aqsa Storm

operation and the ensuing outcry from across the Islamic world not only halted the normalization process but also created significant obstacles for any future normalization efforts by Arab countries with the Zionist regime. The brutality of the Zionist regime against the people of Gaza and all Palestinians, along with the resurgence of Palestine as a central issue in the Islamic world, has effectively elevated the costs of normalization for Arab states—especially for Saudi Arabia, which claims to lead the Islamic community—thus stalling the normalization of relations at least in the short term (Yeshiltash, 2023).

In other words, the Al-Aqsa Storm underscored that peace in the region is unattainable without resolving the issue of occupied Palestine. Furthermore, the military and intelligence prowess of the Zionist regime, derived from its technological capabilities, has consistently attracted interest from regional and international countries seeking to normalize relations and enhance cooperation. Nations in the region (from the Pahlavi era in Iran to the United Arab Emirates) and beyond (including India, China, and European governments) have viewed the regime's capabilities as a target for strengthening ties with Tel Aviv. The regime's technological and intelligence diplomacy has facilitated its extensive engagement on the global stage.

Consequently, the image of the invincibility of the Israeli military in the minds of Arab regimes has been critical for the normalization project, particularly with Saudi Arabia, as well as for integrating Israel into the regional security and economic order and forming a new Middle Eastern framework centered on the United States. The irreparable damage inflicted by the Al-Aqsa Storm operation on this facet of the Zionist regime's power may prompt a reevaluation of perspectives among leaders of other countries, altering their perceptions of the regime. As David Rosenberg, an analyst for Haaretz, notes:

"Israel's capabilities and its potential for innovation remain unchanged; however, its reputation as the so-called startup nation will almost certainly diminish and face more critical scrutiny" (Rosenberg, 2023).

In addition, following the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, Turkey's relations with the Zionist regime deteriorated, and several Latin American, African, and Asian countries either severed or reduced their ties with the

regime. The Al-Aqsa Storm and the Zionist regime's "Iron Fist" strategy against Gaza, which resulted in the massacre of Palestinians, ignited global anger, diminishing the regime's legitimacy in the international community and correspondingly reducing its "soft power." South Africa's complaint against the Zionist regime at the International Court of Justice and the subsequent condemnation of the regime exemplify this decline in legitimacy.

Based on a report from the Israeli National Security Institute, since the onset of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, 95 percent of demonstrations have been in support of the Palestinians, while only 5 percent have been in support of the Zionist regime (Leif, 2023). Additionally, other reports from this institute indicate a rise in anti-Zionist sentiments in major countries, including China (Gering, 2023) and the United States (Meller & Freifeld, 2023). Given the significance of these two countries in the international system, this trend could have long-term strategic implications for the Zionist regime. Jason Burke, a reporter for The Guardian, has commented on the growing anti-Zionist stance in countries around the world:

"Israel may win the military battle with its vast and powerful military equipment, but in the broader sense, it is losing the war. With protests and public uprisings around the world against Israel's war crimes, the Israeli regime has already lost the battle" (Burke, 2023).

Beyond the protests held globally against the Zionist regime, the Al-Aqsa Storm has significantly undermined the regime's legitimacy and credibility in Arab societies. A recent survey published by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies among 16 Arab countries regarding the Gaza conflict indicates overwhelming support for Hamas's actions on October 7, with 92 percent stating that the Palestinian issue is the most important matter in the Arab world—an unprecedented figure in the past decade. In contrast, negative perceptions of the United States have increased following the Gaza war, with Arab communities identifying the U.S. more than Israel as a threat to regional peace and stability. Ninety-four percent evaluated U.S. policy in the conflict very negatively. Furthermore, only 13 percent believe that peace with the Zionist regime is possible, while just 4 percent of respondents support recognizing the Israeli regime. This sentiment is particularly pronounced in Saudi Arabia, which was seen as a primary candidate for normalizing relations with the Zionist regime. According to the Arab Center for

Research and Policy Studies, in response to the question of whether to recognize Israel, 57 percent initially selected "I don't know"; however, after the war, this figure dropped to 29 percent, while opposition rose from 38 percent to 68 percent (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2024).

These statistics come at a time when support for the Resistance Axis has increased. Many people in the region, particularly in Arab countries, view the actions of the Resistance Front more favorably compared to those of other nations. According to a survey by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 49 percent of respondents rated Iran's actions as "very good" or "good," a figure that surpasses perceptions of other countries, including Turkey, China, Russia, and Germany (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2024).

Additionally, the Arab Biometric report indicates that the perception of countries in the region and beyond—including Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, and the United States—has turned negative among the people of Tunisia following the Al-Aqsa Storm. In this context, only perceptions of the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran remain optimistic (Arab Biometric, 2023).

Such attitudes toward the Zionist regime and the Resistance Axis in the region could have numerous long-term implications for the Israeli regime. In other words, the Al-Aqsa Storm and the actions of the Zionist regime against the people of Gaza have bolstered the narrative and ideals of the Resistance Axis against the Israeli regime (Byman, 2023).

In this context, Bajaghli and Nasr discuss the increase in popularity and internal cohesion of the Resistance Axis in their article for Foreign Policy titled "How the Gaza War Revived the Resistance Axis." According to their findings, the portrayal of the Israeli regime during the Al-Aqsa Storm as a "child-killing regime," the decline in U.S. legitimacy in the region, and the rising public support for the Resistance Axis are profound and long-term consequences of the Al-Aqsa Storm for the Israeli regime (Bajaghli and Nasr, 2024).

Given the above analyses, the Al-Aqsa Storm operation has impacted the foreign policy of the Zionist regime, presenting numerous challenges at both the regional and international levels. In summary, it has led to the cessation of normalization efforts, a reduction in international legitimacy, and, consequently, a decline in the regime's soft power. Domestically, the

Al-Aqsa Storm has threatened the national security of the Zionist regime in political and social dimensions. With the operation and the severe blows dealt to the regime by Palestinian resistance groups, perceptions of threat within Israeli society have increased. In a recent survey in the occupied territories, the issue that concerns most Israelis (53 percent) in the short term (within the next year) is security—a figure unprecedented in recent decades.

The Hamas attack altered the assumptions that had defined the status quo between Israel and Gaza for nearly two decades. Despite fears of a multi-front war, Israelis had primarily focused their attention on the northern front. Given the recent developments, it seems that the strategies and military doctrine of the Zionist regime will also undergo changes, with a particular focus on Gaza and its evolving situation.

Moreover, one of the main propaganda strategies of the Zionist regime to attract Jewish communities has been the claim that "Israel is the safest place for Jews." However, with the recent developments and the deaths of many Jews, this assertion has been called into question, effectively transforming "Israel into the most unsafe place for Jews." Accordingly, information from the Israeli immigration office indicates that half a million Israelis have left the regime since October 7 and have not returned (Saba, 2023). This poses numerous demographic challenges for the regime, which seeks to encourage Jewish immigration while preventing reverse migration, and intensifies the leaders' perception of the threat posed by shifts in demographic ratios, referred to as a "ticking time bomb."

In this regard, three months after the start of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Israeli regime reported a significant decrease in immigration to the occupied territories following October 7; in October 2023, only 1,163 people immigrated to the occupied territories, compared to 2,364 in September 2023. Furthermore, a study by the ERI research institute in Tel Aviv revealed that while 66 percent of young people aged 18 to 44 stated in 2022 that "even if given the opportunity, they would not leave Israel," this figure dropped to 46 percent in 2023, with 54 percent of these young individuals expressing a willingness to explore emigration options practically (Noor News, 2023). Meanwhile, the displacement of a significant number of people in both southern and northern occupied Palestine, coupled with the regime's

inability to address this issue, has led to a "crisis of trust" in the regime (Kerschner, 2023).

Another consequence of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation pertains to the political and party dynamics within the Zionist regime. Undoubtedly, the wartime conditions and the psychological atmosphere following the Al-Aqsa Storm will prevent discussions about "who is to blame?" However, once the immediate tensions subside, such topics may become hotly debated within the Israeli regime. A similar situation occurred during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, leading to the establishment of the Agranat Commission to investigate the failures of the Israeli Defense Forces during that conflict. This ultimately resulted in the dismissal of four senior officers, including the head of Military Intelligence, the resignation of Golda Meir's government, and widespread protests.

A similar scenario could unfold for Netanyahu and the military and security leaders of the Israeli regime, potentially resulting in internal tensions. Dalia Scheindlin, a Jewish analyst residing in the occupied territories, argues in her article that the Jewish community in these lands has a historical tendency to "abandon their leaders during wartime." She references the downfall of Golda Meir after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the fall of Ehud Barak following the Second Intifada in 2000, and the collapse of Ehud Olmert after the defeat by Hezbollah in the 33-Day War (Scheindlin, 2023).

According to recent surveys, a majority of Israelis believe that Netanyahu is responsible for the military failure, with over half (56 percent) calling for his resignation. Other polls indicate a sharp decline in the popularity of Netanyahu's Likud party, which has fallen from 32 seats to 19. In another survey, only 21 percent of respondents believe that Netanyahu should remain as Prime Minister after the war. Just a few years ago, he was referred to as "Mr. Security" and "Mr. Economy" due to his popularity in the occupied territories. However, many experts believe that the Al-Aqsa Storm operation marks the beginning of the end for Netanyahu and the Likud party, potentially removing him from the political scene like other leaders of the Zionist regime, such as Moshe Dayansa and Ariel Sharon (Lifer, 2023).

Beyond these issues, the violence of the Zionist regime and the awakening of "Palestinian identity" in the occupied territories and the West Bank, coupled with the possibility of its spillover into neighboring

countries—particularly Jordan, where 60 percent of the population is Palestinian—could lead to unrest and even a "third intifada." Historical trends over the past seven decades show that periods of war tend to shift Israeli politics toward the right, which increases the level of violence by settlers against Palestinians and, correspondingly, the anger of Palestinians toward their occupiers. This dynamic effectively creates a vicious cycle of violence in the occupied territories, further inflaming the security situation for the Israeli regime.

Nathan Sachs, a scholar at the Brookings Institution and a professor at Georgetown University, noted that "the Al-Aqsa Storm has become a trauma for the residents of the occupied areas, rendering negotiation with the Palestinians nearly impossible. On the other hand, Israel's assault on Gaza has left unforgivable crimes in the public consciousness of the Palestinian people. Consequently, both sides perceive the existence of the other as a threat" (Sachs, 2024).

Notably, there has been an increase in the popularity of Hamas and other resistance groups in the West Bank and Gaza. In a survey conducted on November 14, 2023, by the Arab World Center for Research and Development, 76 percent of respondents in Gaza and the West Bank expressed a positive view of Hamas, a significant increase from just 27 percent in September (Pape, 2023).

Daniel Byman published an article in Foreign Policy discussing the strengthening narrative of resistance and Hamas's actions against the Israeli regime. He stated, "Israel's aggressive response and the high level of civilian casualties have validated Hamas's methods for many in the region. This means that Hamas, or any other resistance group, has fertile ground for growth in Gaza. This is a significant long-term factor, as nearly half of Gaza's 2.2 million population is under 18. Outside of Gaza, this narrative bolsters support for Iran and other enemies of Israel. Moreover, it complicates open cooperation between countries like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates with Israel" (Byman, 2023).

The internal consequences of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation in the political-social dimension of Israel include:

1. Increased political tension in the occupied territories,
2. Intensification of the political crisis,
3. Movement of the Zionist regime toward radicalization and increased extremism in the occupied territories,
4. Growth and strengthening of Palestinian resistance groups in the surrounding environment of Israel.

Economic Consequences

One of the most significant economic consequences of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation has been the "damage to the economic foundations of the Zionist regime." Since the onset of the operation, the value of the Israeli currency (shekel) has experienced an unprecedented decline, with each dollar now worth 4 shekels. Since October 7, Israeli stocks have faced severe drops, leading to the worst performance globally. The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange fell by 16 percent, equivalent to a loss of $25 billion. JPMorgan has forecasted that the Israeli economy may face an 11 percent recession in the third quarter of 2023. Furthermore, according to analyses by Israeli economic experts, the regime's budget deficit is expected to reach 1.5 percent of GDP for 2024, amounting to a minimum of 27 billion shekels—marking the largest financial loss for the regime since the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (GTN24, 2023).

The sharp decline in foreign investment, particularly in the high-tech sector—which is a cornerstone of Israel's economic diplomacy—and the plummeting stock values of companies like Intel and other major global firms operating in Israel are additional repercussions of the Al-Aqsa Storm conflict. In June 2023, Netanyahu announced that Intel planned to invest $25 billion in constructing a new factory in the southern city of Kiryat Gat, located 42 kilometers from the Gaza Strip. However, with the onset and escalation of the Al-Aqsa Storm operation into Israeli settlements, the feasibility of pursuing such projects has become uncertain. Beyond this, the costs associated with prolonged battles, resulting from the mobilization of over 360,000 reserve forces and widespread shutdowns throughout Israel—especially in the north and south—along with potential increases in defense budgets post-conflict, will pose further challenges to the Israeli economy (Vohra, 2023).

According to reports from Israeli media, the optimistic estimate for the costs of the war could reach around 200 billion shekels (approximately $54 billion), which is equivalent to one-third of the

government's expenditures for 2023 and exceeds the GDP of countries like Lebanon (85.8 billion shekels), Jordan (176 billion shekels), or Latvia (152 billion shekels). Moreover, Daniel Egel, a researcher at the RAND Corporation, believes that the war could result in Israel losing approximately $400 billion in economic activity over the next decade (Egel, 2023).

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Additionally, with the onset of the war, Chevron announced the shutdown of the Tamar natural gas field, one of the key sources of gas used for electricity generation and export in Israeli settlements. This closure, prompted by fears of military attacks from the Resistance Axis, has halted Israel's gas exports to Egypt and Jordan, while also increasing pressure on the European gas market.

Carole Nakhle, in her article titled "Israel's Gas Exports During Wartime," discusses the challenges of gas exports in light of the political and military instability resulting from Palestinian operations. She states, "Given Israel's limited export options and the instability in the political and security situation, it is challenging to consider Israeli gas secure in terms of investment and export markets" (Nakhle, 2023).

Moreover, the Israeli tourism industry, which generated $5 billion in revenue in 2022, is expected to face a severe decline for an indefinite period. According to the CEO of the Israeli Travel Agencies Association, activities in the foreign tour industry have decreased by approximately 80 percent since the beginning of the war.

With the war extending to the Red Sea and attacks from Yemen's Ansar Allah on the Israeli regime and its vessels, Israel's commercial activities in the Red Sea—its key link to the eastern world—have also been disrupted. An analysis by the Israeli newspaper Globus highlights that "the Al-Aqsa Storm war and the attacks by Ansar Allah have delayed

delivery timelines for goods by up to 19 days, and recent actions by Yemeni armed forces and the Ansar Allah movement against Israel have increased the transportation costs of each container from China to the port of Ashdod by 9 to 14 percent. Meanwhile, international shipping companies are avoiding transporting Israeli goods. Additionally, high insurance premiums are raising the risk of war for each container, which is currently leading to increased shipping costs for containers to Israeli ports" (Siaq, 2023).

Elizabeth Bruenig, a columnist for Foreign Policy, points out that "currently, only the ports of Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea have significantly higher war risk premiums compared to Ashdod [the Israeli port]. If the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah escalates, the Haifa port, which was targeted by Lebanese resistance in the 2006 war, could also be compromised" (Bruenig, 2023).

The Israeli regime imports and exports nearly 99 percent of its necessary goods via sea. A significant portion of food supplies is brought in through maritime routes, making any increase in insecurity potentially catastrophic for the regime.

Conclusion and Recommendations:

Based on the data presented, the Al-Aqsa Storm operation delivered a significant blow to the Zionist regime, one that it will struggle to recover from for a long time. The effects of this conflict will leave a lasting impact on the structure of the Israeli regime. This war will not only profoundly affect Israel's foreign policy and its internal and security dynamics, but it will also alter existing regional processes (such as normalization efforts). In other words, it will shift regional alignments in favor of the Resistance Axis. Furthermore, the Al-Aqsa Storm will have a deep impact on the strategies of international powers, particularly the United States, which has sought to reduce its presence in the Middle East.

The United States, which was preparing to scale back its involvement in the region through an offshore balancing strategy, experienced a shift in perspective following the Al-Aqsa Storm operation. A week prior to the operation, Jake Sullivan, the U.S. National Security Advisor, described the Middle East as more stable than it had been for decades. However, the onset of the Al-Aqsa Storm changed this outlook. The increased military presence of the U.S. and its partners in the region, as

well as the initiation of operations in the Middle East—especially against Yemen and Iraq—reflect a deeper U.S. involvement in conflicts from which it had sought to extricate itself.

The Al-Aqsa Storm has called into question many established assumptions in the region, such as the invincibility of the Israeli regime, its intelligence and technological prowess, the feasibility of normalization without addressing the Palestinian issue, the dismissal of Palestinian resistance groups, and the movement toward a "New Middle East." It has introduced new concepts in the political and military landscape, including the rising role of non-state actors, the unresolved nature of geopolitical and ideological tensions, the potential for surprising powerful states, and the limitations of military tools. Accordingly, the Al-Aqsa Storm presents several opportunities for the Resistance Axis and the Islamic Republic of Iran, summarized as follows:

1. Halting the normalization process between Arab and Islamic countries and the Zionist regime (especially Saudi Arabia).
2. Re-establishing Palestine as the foremost issue for the Islamic world.
3. Driving the Israeli regime into a strategic deadlock within the occupied territories.
4. Increasing internal divisions within the military, political, and intelligence establishments of the Israeli regime.
5. Undermining the regime's intelligence and security image, thereby discrediting its perceived capabilities.
6. Weakening the regime's deterrence and eroding the perception of Israel's invincibility among regional leaders and populations.
7. Enhancing Iran's position and that of the Resistance Front in the Arab world and among regional allies against the crimes of the Israeli regime.
8. Entrapping the Israeli regime in a "vicious cycle" where any display of power reduces its legitimacy and complicates its soft power in establishing relations with other countries.

Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran must not only bolster its intelligence and security monitoring capabilities but also keep the Palestinian issue at the forefront of discussions through media and diplomatic channels. This includes highlighting the crimes of the Israeli regime and its ineffectiveness in technological, intelligence, military, and political dimensions to target its soft power, as well as

strengthening anti-Zionist organizations worldwide (including BDS or Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions).

Strengthening anti-Israeli movements by providing them with resources and amplifying the eight-decade oppression of Palestinians can garner public support, especially in academic environments—demonstrated by the Al-Aqsa Storm as fertile ground for anti-Zionist sentiments. The internal tensions following the Al-Aqsa Storm in the Israeli regime present another opportunity to leverage cognitive and media strategies to exploit the potential for further internal fissures within the regime.

It is crucial not to assume that the halt of normalization efforts between Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, with the Israeli regime is definitive. The bilateral relations and mutual interests are so deeply intertwined that normalization may resume after some time. However, suspending this process and avoiding public acknowledgment of relations can provide opportunities to devise more effective strategies to prevent such developments and increase the costs of normalization.

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